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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAR ES SALAAM 001533

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PARM](#) [PINR](#) [PTER](#) [ENRG](#) [ETZ](#)  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KIKWETE WARMLY WELCOMES BILATERAL  
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

REF: A. A. DAR ES SALAAM 1286  
[1](#)B. B. DAR ES SALAAM 1508

Classified By: Michael L. Retzer, Chief of Mission, for reason 1.4(d).

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador Retzer met with President Kikwete September 11 to personally convey President Bush's invitation for a bilateral meeting in New York during the UN General Assembly. President Kikwete warmly welcomed the meeting, and proceeded to engage Ambassador Retzer on several issues of importance to the U.S., including a UN force for Darfur, ACOTA peacekeeping training, and Tanzania's position on several UNSC-related items including Iran, Burma, and the contest between Guatemala and Venezuela. To our surprise, Kikwete said Tanzania would "volunteer" to participate in a UN peacekeeping Mission in Darfur. He said he understood the U.S. interest in bringing the case of Burma's repressive military regime before the Security Council, and he hoped that the Latin Americans would reach agreement on a single candidate. He intimated, however, that if the group's choice was Guatemala and Venezuela refused to withdraw its candidacy, Tanzania would vote for Guatemala. He expressed visible concern over the political impasse with Zanzibar, adding he would take concrete steps to address the impasse before the end of the year. When the Ambassador probed Kikwete on the possibility of an Article 98 (as we have done in the past), Kikwete did not rule out movement on an agreement and said he had asked his "legal department to see if there is something we can do." END SUMMARY.

President Kikwete Enthusiastic About Meeting President Bush

[1](#)2. (C) Ambassador Retzer informed President Kikwete that he had been selected as the single representative from Sub-Saharan Africa to meet bilaterally with President Bush during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meetings in New York. The Ambassador added that the selection of President Kikwete for Africa reflected the high esteem in which Washington held him. Kikwete emphasized how much he valued Tanzania's relationship with the U.S. and said that he was excited about his meeting with President Bush. The Ambassador also told President Kikwete that he had been invited to participate in a Roundtable discussion on democracy with 25 other heads of state, hosted by President Bush on September 19. "If your schedule permits, we hope you will be able to participate in this important discussion,"

Ambassador Retzer said. President Kikwete responded affirmatively, saying, "I will definitely be there."

#### Kikwete Encourages Sudan: Turn in Green Helmets for Blue Ones

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¶3. (C) Ambassador Retzer thanked President Kikwete for Tanzania's co-sponsorship of the UN resolution, which authorized transition from an African Union (AU) to a United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur. Laughing, President Kikwete responded that he had made the Sudanese Government "very angry" by supporting a UN mission. He said that the Sudanese needed to realize that peace was in their hands and that they "should not sub-contract out responsibility to the AU, UN or anybody else." Kikwete then outlined the basis for Tanzania's position on the issue: (i) the UN has the primary responsibility for peacekeeping and countries should not prevent it from its rightful role; (ii) African countries could still volunteer to participate in the UN mission; and (iii) with the AU mission almost entirely dependent on the European Union's support, a "big crisis" could ensue if funding were to become unavailable. He added (to our surprise) that Tanzania would also "volunteer" for a UN force in Darfur.

¶4. (C) Kikwete elaborated on his efforts to encourage Sudan's Government of National Unity to allow a UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan. "I have made my position clear to Sudanese leaders in person at recent AU Summits and with two letters that I sent to President Omar el-Bashir," Kikwete said. He also told the Ambassador that he had tried to persuade one of South Sudan's ministers, who was originally from the Darfur region, that African peacekeepers would merely be turning in their green helmets for blue ones.

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"I believe that I convinced the minister with this point but that he did not have enough sway over the higher leadership." Kikwete assured the Ambassador that he would meet with Sudanese leaders during the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Havana and continue encouraging Sudan to accept a UN force.

#### Sudan's Refusal of UN Mission: Fears of al-Qaeda?

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¶5. (C) On the topic of Sudan's reluctance to allow a UN Mission in Darfur, President Kikwete raised a concern that he recently learned about through South African President, Thabo Mbeki. During Burundi's recent Peace Summit in Dar es Salaam on September 7 (Ref B), President Mbeki told Kikwete about the fear of South Sudan's President, Lt-Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, that al-Qaeda would use the UN Mission as an occasion to become active in Sudan. Ambassador Retzer thanked Kikwete for raising the issue and acknowledged fears in some quarters about al-Qaeda potentially exploiting the issue.

#### Guatemala or Venezuela for UNSC?

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¶6. (C) Noting that Guatemala had never served on the UNSC before, while Venezuela had held a seat four times, Ambassador Retzer asked for Tanzania's support in electing Guatemala to the Security Council. President Kikwete said that Venezuela had sent an envoy to Tanzania, expressing Venezuela's desire to serve again on the UNSC and asking for Tanzania's support. Kikwete explained what he told the envoy and what he planned to tell Venezuela's President, Hugo Chavez, during his meeting with him in Havana: "Countries in Latin America should work to develop consensus and then propose a candidate. Otherwise, we will vote in a rational way based on the merit of each candidate." President Kikwete noted that he did not think Latin America would reach consensus nor did he think anyone could convince President Chavez not to pursue a seat in the UNSC. He likened the case of Venezuela to Sudan, highlighting the time when Sudan ran against Mauritius for a seat on the Security Council and lost. "I think the same thing will happen with Venezuela,"

Kikwete said, noting pointedly that Sudan had failed to carry the day (Comment: and, we believe, intimating that Tanzania would vote for Guatemala in similar circumstances).

#### Tanzania's Stance on Iran and Burma

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¶7. (C) The Ambassador also urged President Kikwete to support USG efforts urging Iran to stop enriching uranium and addressing Burma's persistent human rights violations in the UNSC. President Kikwete said that he had met with Iran's President and that Ahmadinejad had assured him that the Government of Iran was pursuing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes of energy generation only. Reiterating Tanzania's bottom-line position (Ref A), President Kikwete emphasized that Tanzania had no problem with the peaceful use of nuclear technology but adamantly opposed the spread of nuclear weapons and emergence of new nuclear states. Tanzania would not, therefore, support Iran's acquisition of nuclear technology to amass weapons. Regarding Burma, President Kikwete said that what the Burmese military leaders were doing was terrible and that the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi for decades amounted to torture. While clearly expressing his abhorrence of the Burmese regime, however, he did not address whether the Security Council rather than the Human Rights Commission was the proper forum.

#### Article 98: Still on the Table

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¶8. (C) Discussing the promising expansion of U.S.-Tanzanian military-to-military relations, Ambassador Retzer informed President Kikwete about the upcoming strategy conference under the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, and the October visit to Tanzania of General Ward, Commander of European Command (EUCOM). The Ambassador also directly raised the issue of Article 98, saying that the USG and GOT should come to a decision on whether there was a way to reach an agreement. The Ambassador told Kikwete that the USG would need a signal from

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GOT on its willingness to move forward. Kikwete replied that he had asked his legal department to look at the Article 98 and "see what they might do," but that he was still waiting for a report on its views. President Kikwete noted that both General Ward's visit and the ACOTA Conference would be welcome and beneficial.

#### Kikwete Now Ready to Begin Reconciliation on Zanzibar

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¶9. (C) After praising President Kikwete's role in the Burundi peace process, Ambassador Retzer inquired about progress on reconciliation efforts to help overcome Zanzibar's political stalemate. Responding with greater clarity and confidence than in past meetings (Ref A), Kikwete told the Ambassador that movement on reconciliation would become a top priority when he returned from the UNGA. Kikwete explained that he had only been in office nine months and had been busy getting his feet on the ground. "Now, I feel satisfied and ready to take up the matter." He emphasized that the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Central Committee had recently come to an understanding that something needed to happen on Zanzibar reconciliation and that he had made "a firm decision to move ahead with the process." President Kikwete assured the Ambassador that "Before 2007, reconciliation efforts will be active on Zanzibar."

¶10. (C) President Kikwete offered his own insight on the root cause of Zanzibar's political distress: over-reliance on the State. He explained that the political leadership on Zanzibar put too much focus on the State instead of using democratic means and good leadership. "In elective politics, you may not be able to prevent change. There are limits to what the State can and cannot do." Kikwete emphasized that at the end of the day, in a democratic system, people want to elect a good leader who they feel can help them sort out

their problems. The leader, however, must go out and convince the people because it is the people who vote, not the State."

#### Ambassador Congratulates GOT on MCA Compact Proposal

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¶11. (SBU) The Ambassador also congratulated President Kikwete on the GOT's recent submission of its Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Compact proposal. With a sigh of relief, President Kikwete said that he was happy the GOT had completed its component and exclaimed that "this type of development was needed yesterday!" Ambassador Retzer noted that if all goes well MCC Compact signing could take place toward mid-to-late 2007. From his side, President Kikwete said that he was looking for ways to expedite the process and that if the topic were raised with President Bush, he would like to extend an invitation to President Bush to visit Tanzania for signing of the Compact.

#### Coming Soon: Four Proposals to Assist Presidential Office

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¶12. (C) Finally, Ambassador Retzer updated President Kikwete on his recent request for technical assistance to reform the administration of Tanzania's Presidential Office (Ref A). Ambassador Retzer explained that he would soon send President Kikwete proposals from Harvard University, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Carnegie Mellon, and the International Republican Institute (IRI) for his review. Kikwete thanked the Ambassador and said he was looking forward to seeing the proposals. "We want to build the Presidency not the President," Kikwete stressed. "If you only have the President, then you have to always be directing people what to do; people don't take action in your absence," Kikwete added.

#### Comment: Bilateral Relations Continue to Blossom

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¶13. (C) With the news of President Kikwete's bilateral meeting with President Bush, and open discussion on topics ranging from Sudan, to expanded military-to-military relations, to U.S. technical assistance for Tanzania's President's Office, Ambassador Retzer's meeting with President Kikwete reflected the warm and rapidly expanding

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relationship between the U.S. and Tanzania. President Kikwete expressed his excitement about meeting with President Bush as well as the opportunity to participate in the Democracy Roundtable, which he promised to attend. Of particular note was Kikwete's offer to participate in a Darfur peacekeeping force and Kikwete's marked change in tone on Zanzibar. For the first time since assuming Presidency, Kikwete set a timeframe for reconciliation activities to begin - before January 2007 - and portrayed open and very visible concern over the political impasse. We will continue to keep an eye on developments there, and look for innovative ways to support reconciliation. END COMMENT.  
RETZER